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 OPINION 
                      
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Insurance Company of North America ("INA") objects to 
the discharge in bankruptcy of a debt owed to it by David Cohn.  
This appeal turns on the proper interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(2)(B).  The bankruptcy court concluded, and the district 
court affirmed, that INA did not meet its burden of proving that 
it reasonably relied upon a materially false statement contained 
in an investor bond application submitted by Cohn, and the debt 
was therefore dischargeable.  Because the bankruptcy court based 
its decision upon facts that were not in the record, and because 
the district court acted beyond its authority in making its own 
factual findings, we will remand the case to the district court 
with instructions to remand to the bankruptcy court for further 
fact-finding. 
 
 I. 
 Between September 1984 and September 1985, David Cohn 
was involved in a business relationship with a financial 
consultant, Christopher Scutto, an employee of Cigna Individual 
Financial Services Company ("Cigna Financial Services").  Cohn 
became interested in a limited partnership known as The Village 
Apartments Associates Ltd. ("Village Apartments").  In order to 
become a limited partner, Cohn was required to sign a promissory 
  
note for his share, and to obtain a surety for the note.  On 
September 12, 1985, Cohn submitted an investor bond application 
("the application") to INA, requesting INA to act as a surety on 
a promissory note in the principal amount of $47,500 which was to 
be executed between Cohn, as obligor, and the Bank of New York, 
as obligee. 
 Cohn relied upon Scutto and his staff to fill out the 
application and related documentation based upon financial and 
other information that Cohn had provided to Scutto over the 
previous year.  After Scutto completed the application, Cohn 
reviewed it (though he contends that he did not read each page of 
the various documents), and signed it.   
 At the top of the application, the first paragraph 
read:   
 FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROCURING CREDIT OR 
GUARANTEE OF CREDIT FROM INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NORTH AMERICA (SURETY), THE UNDERSIGNED 
FURNISH THIS APPLICATION AND THE INFORMATION 
CONTAINED THEREIN INCLUDING A TRUE AND 
ACCURATE STATEMENT OF THE UNDERSIGNED'S 
FINANCIAL CONDITION AS OF THE DATE OF THIS 
APPLICATION. 
 
Item 9 on the second page of the application requested that the 
applicant list "Real Estate Registered in own name," and 
instructed, "See Sched. No. 5."  Scutto indicated in Item 9 that 
Cohn had real estate valued at $110,000.  Schedule No. 5 required 
as follows: "The legal and equitable title to all the real estate 
listed in this statement is solely in the name of the 
undersigned, except as follows: . . . ."  Two blank lines were 
then provided for entries by the applicant.  Also in Schedule No. 
  
5, immediately below the two blank lines, the application 
provided a table for the applicant to fill out, requesting 
information regarding, inter alia, the description, dimensions, 
improvements, mortgages or liens, and assessed value of each 
property.  It is not clear from the application whether this 
information was requested only regarding real estate not solely 
in applicant's name, or all real estate to which the applicant 
holds legal and equitable title.  Neither the two blank lines nor 
the table were filled in on Cohn's application.1   
 Cohn admits that at the time that he signed the 
application, he did not own real estate valued at $110,000 
registered in his own name.  Cohn testified that before he signed 
the application, he was assured by Scutto that using the ultimate 
value of the asset he was seeking to purchase as part of his 
present net worth, when applying for credit to purchase that very 
same asset, was "an accepted procedure."  Scutto testified that 
such a practice was followed by other individuals in his office.  
 Scutto submitted the application to INA in October 
1985, and it was accepted later that month.  In the interim, INA 
made no inquiry of Cohn or his financial consultant regarding any 
aspect of the real estate questions in the application, including 
the listing of real estate registered in Cohn's own name and the 
absence of any mortgages, liens or other indebtedness as 
reflected in Schedule No. 5.  INA did obtain information from a 
                     
1
.  For clarity, the application is made an addendum to this 
opinion. 
  
credit report that indicated that Cohn had no mortgage, real 
estate payments, or other indebtedness. 
 INA became the surety for the promissory note and Cohn 
became a limited partner in the Village Apartments.  Scutto was 
compensated for the sale by Village Apartments.  Cohn executed an 
indemnification agreement under which Cohn agreed to indemnify 
INA against any loss INA might incur in the event that Cohn 
defaulted on the promissory note.  Thereafter, Cohn defaulted on 
the note and a claim was made against INA based upon the investor 
bond.  Cohn later filed a Chapter 7 proceeding under the 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and listed INA in his schedule 
of creditors whose debts were to be discharged.  INA filed a 
complaint with the bankruptcy court seeking an exception to 
Cohn's discharge for the indebtedness arising from this 
transaction. 
 The bankruptcy court found that INA did not meet its 
burden of proof to demonstrate that it reasonably relied on a 
materially false statement when it accepted Cohn's application 
and refused to exempt Cohn's indebtedness to INA from discharge.  
Insurance Company of North America v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 131 B.R. 
19 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).  While finding that Cohn's application 
contained a materially false statement regarding his financial 
condition, the bankruptcy court based its ultimate conclusion on 
its finding that Cigna Financial Services is the parent company 
of INA.  The court found "troublesome" that INA was "attempting 
to have a debt declared nondischargeable based upon the fraud 
masterminded by an employee of its own parent company."  Id. at 
  
21.  The bankruptcy court held that "any reliance placed upon the 
application by INA was done at its own risk and must be found 
unreasonable."  Id.  Further, the court concluded that INA must 
be estopped from having the debt found nondischargeable because 
it had "unclean hands" in that an "employee of INA's parent 
company" was the ultimate source of the wrongdoing.  Id. at 21-
22. 
 The district court affirmed the order of the bankruptcy 
court, but on different grounds.  It found that INA did not 
reasonably rely on the statement in Item 9: 
 in that the most reasonable reading of 
[Schedule No. 5] is that it provides blank 
lined spaces for the applicant to note which 
scheduled properties are not held solely in 
his name but otherwise requires the applicant 
to specify, inter alia, the location, 
dimensions, liens against and assessed value 
of each property and indeed it being 
illogical to assume that a lender or 
guarantor would require such information only 
for collateral not solely registered to an 
applicant, in that the failure of the debtor 
to identify any property on schedule 5 was 
sufficient to trigger further inquiry by a 
reasonable lender or guarantor, see In re 
Martz, 88 B.R. 663, 674 (E.D. Pa. 1988), and 
in that a simple request of the debtor to 
identify the property listed on line 9 would 
have revealed that this was the value of the 
property the debtor proposed to acquire by 
investment of the borrowed funds. 
 
Insurance Company of North America v. Cohn (In re Cohn), No. 91-
6073 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 1994) (order denying appeal and 
dismissing action).  This appeal followed. 
 
 II. 
  
 The district court had jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  Our jurisdiction rests on 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 As a proceeding tried initially before the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the standard of 
review for the district court is governed by Rule 8013 of the 
Bankruptcy Rules, which provides: 
 On an appeal the district court or bankruptcy 
appellate panel may affirm, modify, or 
reverse a bankruptcy judge's judgment, order, 
or decree or remand with instructions for 
further proceedings.  Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy 
court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
 
Bankruptcy Rule 8013.  
 
 Our review of the district court's order is plenary 
because in bankruptcy cases the district court sits as an 
appellate court.  Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit 
Union, 851 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Universal Minerals, 
Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1981)).  
We review the findings of fact of the bankruptcy court only for 
clear error.  Id. (citing In re Morrissey, 717 F.2d 100, 104 (3d 
Cir. 1983)).  Findings of fact by a trial court are clearly 
erroneous when, after reviewing the evidence, the appellate court 
is "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed."  Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 
U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (1985) (citation omitted).  
  
We have plenary review over questions of law.  Epstein Family 
Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 765-66 (3d Cir. 1994).  
It is error for a district court, when acting in the capacity of 
a court of appeals, to make its own factual findings.  Universal 
Minerals, 669 F.2d at 104. 
 
 III. 
 The overriding purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to 
relieve debtors from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and 
provide them with a fresh start.  Exceptions to discharge are 
strictly construed against creditors and liberally construed in 
favor of debtors.  See, e.g., United States v. Stelweck, 108 B.R. 
488, 495 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).  Title 11, section 523(a)(2) of 
the United States Code provides for exceptions to discharge as 
follows: 
 (a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 
1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title 
does not discharge an individual from any 
debt -- 
    . . .  
 (2) for money, property, services, or an 
extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, 
to the extent obtained by -- 
 (A) false pretenses, a false representation, 
or actual fraud, other than a statement 
respecting the debtor's or an insider's 
financial condition; 
 (B) use of a statement in writing -- 
  (i) that is materially false; 
  (ii) respecting the debtor's or an 
insider's financial condition; 
  (iii) on which the creditor to whom 
the debtor is liable for such 
money, property, services, or 
credit reasonably relied; and 
  
  (iv) that the debtor caused to be 
made or published with intent to 
deceive . . . . 
 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1988).  The burden of proving that a debt 
is nondischargeable under § 523(a) is upon the creditor, who must 
establish entitlement to an exception by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287-88, 111 S. Ct. 
654, 659-60 (1991).  Thus, pursuant to § 523(a)(2)(B), INA must 
prove that Cohn used a statement in writing: (1) that is 
materially false; (2) respecting his financial condition; (3) 
upon which INA reasonably relied; and (4) with the intent to 
deceive INA.  
 
 A. 
 The bankruptcy court held that "[i]t cannot be disputed 
that debtor's application contains a materially false statement 
regarding debtor's financial condition."  Cohn, 131 B.R. at 21.  
The court noted Cohn's admission that at the time he executed the 
application he did not have legal and equitable title to real 
estate valued at $110,000.  Id.  Citing Century Bank of Pinellas 
County v. Clark (In re Clark), 1 B.R. 614, 617 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1979), the bankruptcy court held that Cohn's financial statement 
was sufficiently overstated such that it was a materially false 
statement within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)(B)(i).  Id. 
 While Cohn does not deny that his statement was false, 
he asserts that the statement was not material.  He cites 
Landmark Leasing Inc. v. Martz (In re Martz), 88 B.R. 663, 671 
  
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) and Afsharnia v. Roland (In re Roland), 65 
B.R. 1003, 1006 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986) for the proposition that 
the "materially false" component of § 523(a)(2)(B)(i) requires a 
showing both that the statement was in fact false, and that the 
falsehood was material to the creditor's decision to enter into 
the transaction.  We note, however, that In re Bogstad, 779 F.2d 
370 (7th Cir. 1985), the case upon which both the Martz and 
Roland courts rely, in actuality has a narrower holding than the 
proposition asserted by Cohn.  The Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit wrote:  
 Material falsity has been defined as "an 
important or substantial untruth."  A 
recurring guidepost used by courts has been 
to examine whether the lender would have made 
the loan had he known of the debtor's true 
financial condition. 
 
Bogstad, 779 F.2d at 375 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
Thus, it would appear that the effect of the falsity on the 
creditor's decision to enter into the transaction should be used 
only as one indicia of the materiality of the falsity; it is not 
in fact a second requirement of § 523(a)(2)(B)(i). 
 The materiality prong of the "material falsehood" test 
includes a certain reliance component.  Under a materiality 
analysis, we refer to a creditor's reliance upon a false 
statement in the sense that an untruth can be considered 
important (or "material") if it influences a creditor's decision 
to extend credit.  However, a statement can still be material if 
it is so substantial that a reasonable person would have relied 
upon it, even if the creditor did not in fact rely upon it in the 
  
case at hand.  Cf. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771, 
108 S. Ct. 1537, 1547 (1988) (materiality turns on whether the 
misrepresentation "was predictably capable of affecting, i.e., 
had a natural tendency to affect, the official decision"); United 
States v. Keefer, 799 F.2d 1115, 1127 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he 
test for materiality is not whether the agency actually relied on 
the false statement, but whether the statement was capable of 
influencing, or had a natural tendency to influence, the agency's 
decision.").   
 We note that there is also a reliance component in the 
"reasonable reliance" requirement of § 523(a)(2)(B)(iii).  See 
discussion below in part III B.  These are certainly overlapping 
concepts.  Section 523(a)(2)(B)(iii), however, requires that the 
creditor actually rely on the debtor's statement.  Accordingly, 
if it were reasonable to rely on a debtor's statement, but the 
creditor did not in fact rely upon the false statement, (B)(iii) 
would not be satisfied. 
 We recognize that the distinction between the two 
reliance concepts is somewhat subtle, and to a degree, the 
reliance concept in (B)(i) is subsumed within (B)(iii).  However, 
it is important to keep the distinction intact in light of the 
long-established cannon of statutory construction that in 
construing a statute, courts are obliged to give effect, if 
possible, to every word Congress used.  See, e.g., Gustafson v. 
Alloyd Company, Inc.,    U.S.   , 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (1995) 
("the Court will avoid a reading which renders some words 
  
altogether redundant"); United States v. Menache, 348 U.S. 528, 
538-39, 75 S. Ct. 513, 519-20 (1955). 
 The element of materiality under § 523(a)(2)(B)(i) is a 
question of law.  Cf. United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 73 
(3d Cir. 1985) (materiality element of the crime of making a 
false statement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is a question of 
law); United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 79 (3d Cir. 1977) (in 
a perjury prosecution materiality is "a question of law, decision 
upon which is reserved for the court").  See also United States 
v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 955-65 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (surveying case law regarding whether materiality is 
a question of fact or law).  As such, we review materiality under 
a plenary standard of review.  See, e.g., Epstein Family 
Partnership, 13 F.3d at 765-66.  
 We believe that the material falsity element has 
sufficiently been established.  INA offered the testimony of its 
employee, Steven Hollberg, who gave his expert opinion that the 
bond would not have been issued if the application had not 
indicated that Cohn held $110,000 in real estate.  Cohn contends 
that Hollberg's conclusion is speculative and unsupported since 
he did not participate in the development of the underwriting 
criteria governing investor bonds, he did not specifically review 
or have any input in determining Cohn's eligibility, nor did he 
participate in INA's decision to act as surety.   
 We are unpersuaded by Cohn's arguments.  Because the 
element of materiality under § 523(a)(2)(B)(i) is an objective 
one, our determination does not have to turn on Hollberg's 
  
credibility regarding INA's actual reliance on the false 
statement.  It is sufficient that the false statement is one that 
is capable of influencing, or had a natural tendency to 
influence, a creditor's decision.  As INA points out, Cohn's 
application indicated a total net worth of $259,000.  The false 
asset of $110,000 constituted a substantial portion of his 
purported net worth.  Under the circumstances of this case, we 
find it fully logical and reasonable that such a substantial sum 
could have influenced a creditor's decision to enter into such a 
transaction.  We conclude that the bankruptcy court did not err 
in its determination that Cohn's financial statement was both 
false and material. 
 
 B. 
 Both the bankruptcy court and the district court found 
that INA did not meet its burden of proof on the "reasonable 
reliance" component of § 523(a)(2)(B)(iii).  The courts, however, 
based their determinations on different grounds and we address 
their analyses separately.   
 
 1. 
 The bankruptcy court held: 
 [W]e find troublesome the fact that INA is 
attempting to have a debt declared 
nondischargeable based upon the fraud 
masterminded by an employee of its own parent 
company.  For this reason, we conclude that 
any reliance placed upon the application by 
INA was done at its own risk and must be 
found unreasonable.  See, Signal Consumer 
Discount Company v. Malachosky (In re 
  
Malachosky), 98 B.R. 222, 224 (Bankr. W.D. 
Pa. 1989). 
 
Cohn, 131 B.R. at 21.  In Signal, cited by the bankruptcy court, 
the same corporation that extended the loan also knew that the 
written statement of the debtor's financial condition was false.  
Signal, 98 B.R. at 223.  Nonetheless, the corporation tried to 
rely upon the truth of the written statement.  Id. at 223-24.  
The Signal court found that the creditor had not reasonably 
relied upon the statement.  Id. at 224.  If INA knew that the 
written statement was untrue prior to granting the investor bond, 
then it, like the creditor in Signal, could not have reasonably 
relied upon the written statement.  Indeed, the bankruptcy court 
based its holding on the factual predicate that Cigna Financial 
Services is the parent company of INA.  The bankruptcy court's 
determination, however, is flawed for two reasons.  First, we 
find that the trial record lacks sufficient facts from which the 
bankruptcy court could determine the exact relationship between 
Cigna Financial Services and INA.  Second, there is no basis in 
the record to impute the knowledge of a Cigna Financial Services 
employee to INA. 
 There is little evidence in the record regarding the 
relationship between the two companies.  INA maintains that there 
are a number of "Cigna" companies:  Cigna Company is the parent, 
with subsidiaries including Cigna Holding, Inc., INA Holdings, 
Inc., Insurance Company of North America, Cigna Investment Group, 
Connecticut General Life, Ins. and Cigna Individual Financial 
  
Services, Inc.  The following testimony of Hollberg reflects how 
confusing and muddled this issue is: 
 BY MR. SELTZER: 
 Q: Now, does Wade Hill Services of INA have 
any relationship to Cigna Financial Services? 
 A: I believe INA is related to Cigna as a 
subsidiary of Cigna. 
 Q: But Cigna, in fact, owns INA; is that 
correct? 
 A: That is correct. 
 Q:  Okay. 
  THE COURT:  And they own 
Connecticut General, right? 
  THE WITNESS:  That's the company -- 
  THE COURT: What's left of it. 
  THE WITNESS: Yeah, exactly. 
 BY MR. SELTZER: 
 Q: Okay.  And based on the information you 
have in your file, do you know who if anybody 
Mr. Scutto was working with or for at the 
time that you had dealings with him relative 
to the financial application and investor 
bond? 
 A: It's evident just from that letter that 
he was working for Cigna as a financial 
analyst, I believe it says. 
 Q: That being the parent company of INA? 
 A: That's correct. 
 Q: Okay.  But you've never had any direct 
contact with Mr. Scutto at all; right? 
 A: No, I have not. 
 
App. at 112a-13a.   
 We are unable to determine from the record the 
relationship between INA and Cigna Financial Services; it is 
unclear from Hollberg's testimony which "Cigna" is the parent 
company of INA -- Cigna Company or Cigna Financial Services.  It 
is not surprising that the relationship between INA and Cigna 
Financial Services remained unresolved since the issue was 
  
neither raised in the pleadings nor briefed before the bankruptcy 
court. 
 Other testimony by Hollberg and Scutto indicated that 
there was no contact or relationship between Cigna Financial 
Services and INA regarding the transaction and the real estate 
value.2  App. at 91a, 96a, 123a-24a.  As INA correctly contends, 
only when the corporate veil can be pierced can INA be said to 
have knowledge of the falsity of the written statement.  Well-
established precedent holds that in order for one company to be 
held responsible for the actions of a related company, it is 
necessary that there be sufficient facts to pierce the corporate 
veil.  See, e.g., Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, 
Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992) (statement of subsidiary 
may be attributed to its corporate parent where parent dominates 
activities of subsidiary), cert. denied,    U.S.   , 113 S. Ct. 
1262 (1993); Culbreth v. Amosa (Pty) Ltd., 898 F.2d 13, 14 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (party seeking to pierce corporate veil must establish 
that controlling corporation wholly ignored separate status of 
controlled corporation and so dominated and controlled its 
affairs that separate existence was mere sham); A.K. Nahas 
Shopping Center, Inc. v. Reitmeyer (In re Nahas), 161 B.R. 927, 
932-33 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993).  The record is conspicuously 
lacking any such facts.3  
                     
2
.  Scutto testified that he had contact with INA regarding 
Cohn's liquidity.  This information exchange does not change the 
fact that INA was not aware of the false real estate value. 
3
.  In addition to basing its determination of unreasonable 
reliance on the putative relationship between the Cigna and INA, 
  
 
 2. 
 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's 
holding of unreasonable reliance upon a false statement, but 
based its determination on different grounds.  The district court 
found that INA unreasonably relied upon the application because 
the failure of Cohn to identify any property on Schedule No. 5 
was sufficient to trigger further inquiry by a reasonable lender 
or guarantor.  The district court predicated its holding on its 
finding that: 
 the most reasonable reading [of Schedule No. 
5] is that it provides blank lined spaces for 
the applicant to note which scheduled 
properties are not held solely in his name 
but otherwise requires the applicant to 
(..continued) 
the bankruptcy court also concluded that INA must be estopped on 
equitable grounds from attempting to have the debt found 
nondischargeable, based upon the same factual predicate.  The 
bankruptcy court held: 
 
 Furthermore, we conclude that INA must be 
estopped from attempting to have this debt 
found nondischargeable due to its unclean 
hands.  It must be remembered that bankruptcy 
courts are essentially courts of equity, and 
as such, should render decisions with 
equitable considerations in mind.  We believe 
that it would be extremely unfair to burden 
debtor with a finding that this debt is 
nondischargeable when the ultimate source of 
the wrongdoing can be traced directly to Mr. 
Scutto, an employee of INA's parent company. 
 
Cohn, 131 B.R. at 21-22.  This holding also cannot stand, based 
on the same factual flaws as the unreasonable reliance 
determination.  There is insubstantial record evidence regarding 
the exact relationship between Cigna Financial Services and INA, 
as well as whether knowledge of a Cigna Financial Services 
employee can be imputed to INA.   
  
specify, inter alia, the location, 
dimensions, liens against and assessed value 
of each property and indeed it [is] illogical 
to assume that a lender or guarantor would 
require such information only for collateral 
not solely registered to an applicant. 
 
Cohn, No. 91-6073 (order denying appeal and dismissing action).  
The district court opined that had INA requested Cohn to identify 
the property in Item 9 and explain this inconsistency within the 
application, Cohn would have revealed that the value listed in 
Item 9 was the property Cohn proposed to acquire by investment of 
the borrowed funds.  Id. 
 The district court appears to have applied the correct 
standard in determining a creditor's reasonable reliance.  The 
reasonableness of a creditor's reliance under § 523(a)(2)(B) is 
judged by an objective standard, i.e., that degree of care which 
would be exercised by a reasonably cautious person in the same 
business transaction under similar circumstances.  Martz, 88 B.R. 
at 673; Lesman v. Mitchell (In re Mitchell), 70 B.R. 524, 527 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987); Signal Finance of Ohio v. Icsman (In Re 
Icsman), 64 B.R. 58, 62 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986).   
 A determination of reasonable reliance requires 
consideration of three factors: (1) the creditor's standard 
practices in evaluating credit-worthiness (absent other factors, 
there is reasonable reliance where the creditor follows its 
normal business practices); (2) the standards or customs of the 
creditor's industry in evaluating credit-worthiness (what is 
considered a commercially reasonable investigation of the 
information supplied by debtor); and (3) the surrounding 
  
circumstances existing at the time of the debtor's application 
for credit (whether there existed a "red flag" that would have 
alerted an ordinarily prudent lender to the possibility that the 
information is inaccurate, whether there existed previous 
business dealings that gave rise to a relationship of trust, or 
whether even minimal investigation would have revealed the 
inaccuracy of the debtor's representations).  See Coston v. Bank 
of Malvern (In re Coston), 991 F.2d 257, 261 (5th Cir. 1993) (en 
banc); Mitchell, 70 B.R. at 527-28; Martz, 88 B.R. at 673-74. 
 We agree with the majority of courts of appeals which 
have concluded that the determination of reasonable reliance by a 
lender under § 523(a)(2)(B) is factual in nature and insulated by 
the clearly erroneous standard of review.  See Coston, 991 F.2d 
at 260-61; Bank One, Lexington, N.A. v. Woolum (In re Woolum), 
979 F.2d 71, 75 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,     U.S.   , 113 
S. Ct. 1645 (1993); In re Bonnett, 895 F.2d 1155, 1157 (7th Cir. 
1989); Trattoria, Inc. v. Lansford (In re Lansford), 822 F.2d 
902, 904 (9th Cir. 1987); Leadership Bank, N.A. v. Watson (In re 
Watson), 958 F.2d 977, 978 (10th Cir. 1992); Collins v. Palm 
Beach Savings & Loan (In re Collins), 946 F.2d 815, 817 (11th 
Cir. 1991).   
 The district court based its holding of unreasonable 
reliance upon a number of factual predicates: (1) that the most 
reasonable reading of Schedule No. 5 is that the chart requires 
the applicant to specify information regarding all property that 
the applicant owns (not just property not solely registered in 
the applicant's name); (2) that Cohn's failure to identify any 
  
property in Schedule No. 5 was sufficient to trigger further 
inquiry by a reasonable lender or guarantor (i.e., the existence 
of a "red flag"); and (3) that a simple request of Cohn to 
identify the property listed in Item 9 would have revealed that 
Cohn did not hold legal or equitable title to $110,000 of real 
estate.   
 While the district court may have applied the correct 
legal standard in determining INA's unreasonable reliance, the 
court acted beyond its authority in making its own factual 
findings.  As we held in Universal Minerals: 
 The district court did not set aside any of 
these basic findings . . . .  The district 
court chose, however, to emphasize other 
facts not mentioned in the bankruptcy court's 
opinion and to draw opposing inferences from 
the record.  In doing so, the district court 
erred.  A reviewing court may not substitute 
its own findings for those of the primary 
tribunal merely because it finds other 
inferences more likely. 
 
669 F.2d at 104.  Where, as here, the record is susceptible to 
more than one reasonable reading, factual findings are only 
properly made by the bankruptcy court after a hearing where both 
parties have an opportunity to offer such evidence as they deem 
appropriate.  The bankruptcy court failed to make factual 
findings on these matters.  We have consistently deferred to the 
fact-finding duties of the bankruptcy court and have held that 
where sufficient facts have not been developed by that court, the 
proper response is to remand.  See, e.g., Wheeling-Pittsburgh 
Steel Corp. v. McCune, 836 F.2d 153, 163 (3d Cir. 1987); In re 
  
Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 150-51 (3d Cir. 
1986).   
 Accordingly, we will remand this matter to the district 
court for that court to further remand the case to the bankruptcy 
court for a determination of the reasonableness of INA's reliance 
upon the application, based on either one of two theories: (1) 
whether there are sufficient facts, consistent with established 
Third Circuit precedent, to pierce the corporate veil and hold 
INA responsible for the actions and knowledge of a Cigna 
Financial Services employee; and/or (2) whether after considering 
the creditor's standard practices in evaluating credit-
worthiness, the standards of the creditor's industry in 
evaluating credit-worthiness, and the surrounding circumstances 
existing at the time of the debtor's application, INA reasonably 
relied upon Cohn's written statements in his application. 
 
 C. 
 Because both the bankruptcy court and the district 
court held that INA unreasonably relied upon Cohn's application, 
neither court reached the "intent to deceive" element of § 
523(a)(2)(B)(iv).  The legal parameters of intent to deceive may 
arise on remand and, accordingly, we deem it instructive and 
expedient to set forth directions for future guidance.  
 We acknowledge that because a debtor will rarely, if 
ever, admit that deception was his purpose, this fourth element 
of § 523(a)(2)(B) is extremely difficult for a creditor to prove 
by direct evidence.  Thus, we join with other courts, including 
  
the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, in holding that the intent to deceive can be inferred 
from the totality of the circumstances, including the debtor's 
reckless disregard for the truth.  See, e.g., Equitable Bank v. 
Miller (In re Miller), 39 F.3d 301, 305 (11th Cir. 1994) ("A 
bankruptcy court may look to the totality of the circumstances, 
including the recklessness of a debtor's behavior, to infer 
whether a debtor submitted a statement with intent to deceive."); 
Driggs v. Black, (In re Black), 787 F.2d 503, 506 (10th Cir. 
1986) ("The creditor must establish that a materially false 
writing was made knowingly with the intent to deceive . . . .  
However, the requisite intent may be inferred from a sufficiently 
reckless disregard of the accuracy of the facts."); Martin v. 
Bank of Germantown (In re Martin), 761 F.2d 1163, 1167 (6th Cir. 
1985) ("The standard . . . is that if the debtor either intended 
to deceive the Bank or acted with gross recklessness, full 
discharge will be denied.").  We hold that a creditor can 
establish intent to deceive by proving reckless indifference to, 
or reckless disregard of, the accuracy of the information in the 
financial statement of the debtor when the totality of the 
circumstances supports such an inference. 
 INA seeks to hold Cohn responsible for his agent 
Scutto's misrepresentations.  INA argues that when an agent 
commits a fraud within the scope of the agency, that fraud is 
imputed to the principal for purposes of § 523(a)(2)(B)(iv).   
Cohn maintains that within an agency relationship, "intent to 
deceive" can only be inferred when a principal is recklessly 
  
indifferent to his agent's acts.  While he does not dispute the 
applicability of the agency relationship, Cohn argues that he had 
no reason to doubt Scutto's recommendations regarding the INA 
investment or the method used to fill out the application.  At 
the time Cohn was asked to sign the application, he questioned 
Scutto about the $110,000 listed for real estate on Item 9 of the 
application.  Scutto advised Cohn that the $110,000 listed on 
Item 9 represented the projected value of the limited partnership 
investment and that this approach had been the practice of other 
individuals in the office.   
 We agree with INA that under an agency scenario, common 
law principles of agency law would probably dictate the 
imputation of an agent's fraud to a principal under a § 
523(a)(2)(B)(iv) analysis.  If principles of imputability 
applied, Cohn could be held responsible for Scutto's statements 
and intent to deceive.  However, under the facts of this case, 
agency law is not directly applicable. 
 In the case at hand, Cohn signed the application; Cohn 
made representations to INA; INA relied on Cohn's 
representations.  The third party -- INA -- never relied upon 
anything Cohn's agent said on behalf of Cohn.  Because INA relied 
only upon the principal's representations, agency law is 
irrelevant to this case.  What Cohn relied upon -- the advice of 
Scutto -- is relevant only to the question of his own state of 
mind.  Accordingly, on remand the question remains whether Cohn, 
in light of the totality of the circumstances, intended to 
deceive, or was reckless in making the representations.  
  
 Last, we find of interest discussion in certain 
bankruptcy courts within this circuit regarding a rebuttable 
presumption of intent to deceive that arises upon the making of a 
false financial statement, see, e.g., Horowitz Finance Corp. v. 
Hall (In re Hall), 109 B.R. 149, 155 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); 
First Seneca Bank v. Galizia (In re Galizia), 108 B.R. 63, 67 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989); Signal Consumer Discount Co. v. Hott (In 
re Hott), 99 B.R. 664, 667 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989), and a shifting 
burden of production of evidence upon a creditor's establishing a 
prima facie case, see, e.g., Beneficial Consumer Discount Co. v. 
Russell (In re Russel), 18 B.R. 325, 327 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) 
(once creditor satisfies the first three elements of § 
523(a)(2)(B), a prima facie case is established and the debtor 
then has the burden of going forward with evidence on the 
question of intent to deceive); Bucks County Teachers' Federal 
Credit Union v. McVan (In re McVan), 21 B.R. 632, 634 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1982); Wybro Federal Credit Union v. Mann (In re Mann), 
22 B.R. 306, 308 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).4  We understand that 
                     
4
.  We note that in construing § 14, sub. c(3) of the now 
repealed Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(3), this Court has 
held that "once it is established that a bankrupt has benefitted 
from his issuance of a materially false written statement 
respecting his financial condition, the burden is then on him to 
show by way of excuse that his conduct was not attended by a 
blameworthy attitude or state of mind."  In re Barabato, 398 F.2d 
572, 574 (3d Cir. 1968); see also In the Matter of Perlman, 407 
F.2d 861, 862 (3d Cir. 1969) ("reasonable and sufficient grounds 
were laid at the hearing to show the falsity of the statement and 
the credit relied thereon, and the burden thereupon shifted to 
the bankrupt to prove by competent evidence that he had not 
committed the offense charged").  Section 14, sub. c(3) of the 
repealed act has been incorporated into 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4), 
the current provision pertaining to general discharge.  Whatever 
  
these bankruptcy courts were motivated to formulate the 
presumption and shifting burdens of persuasion in order to assist 
creditors in proving the elusive element of a debtor's intent. 
 As a preliminary matter, we are not aware of any courts 
outside of the Eastern and Western Districts of Pennsylvania that 
have utilized a shifting burdens approach.  Further, we conclude 
that it is not necessary to utilize a presumption of intent or a 
shifting burden of production in processing objections to the 
discharge of a debt.  We observe that in other areas of 
commercial litigation in which fraud is alleged, courts have not 
utilized a shifting burden of production.  A shifting burden is 
no more necessary in the realm of discharge in bankruptcy than in 
any other area of commercial litigation in which fraud is 
alleged.  It is sufficient that fraud must be pled and proven 
with particularity.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).5  Thus, the 
(..continued) 
precedential value our prior interpretations of the former "false 
financial statement" exception to general discharge has to 
current § 727(a)(4), it does not extend to our present 
interpretation of § 523(a)(2).  See, e.g., 4 Collier on 
Bankruptcy ¶ 727.01[1], at 727-6 n.5 (15th ed. 1985) ("The 
concept of nondischargeability of a debt under section 523 is not 
to be confused with denial of discharge under section 727.  It is 
entirely possible for a debtor with nondischargeable debts to 
receive a discharge."); Fluehr v. Paolino (In re Paolino), 75 
B.R. 641, 647-48 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); Citizens State Bank of 
Maryville v. Walker (In re Walker), 53 B.R. 174, 176-182 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mo. 1985). 
5
.  Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
 
 (b) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind.  
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity.  Malice, 
intent, knowledge, and other condition of 
mind of a person may be averred generally. 
  
creditor at all times retains both the burden of proof and the 
burden of production regarding all four elements of § 
523(a)(2)(B). 
 We believe that the standards adopted today (i.e., that 
"intent to deceive" includes both recklessness and subjective 
intent and that it is not appropriate to use a shifting burdens 
analysis) achieve the preferable balance between a creditor's 
difficult burden of proof and the underlying purpose of 
bankruptcy law to provide the debtor with a "fresh start."  Upon 
remand, if the bankruptcy court determines that INA reasonably 
relied upon the application and thereby reaches the element of 
intent to deceive, it should proceed to determine intent to 
deceive in accordance with the principles we have articulated 
today. 
 
 IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district 
court affirming the judgment of the bankruptcy court will be 
reversed.  We will remand this matter to the district court with 
instructions that it remand the case to the bankruptcy court for 
further fact-finding and determinations on the issues of 
reasonable reliance and intent to deceive, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(2)(B), in accordance with the legal standards 
articulated in this opinion. 
(..continued) 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
  
 
 
 
      
